Therefore, since the courts, to facilitate business, uphold requirement contracts despite their partial uncertainty, they should be held valid regardless of the absence of an estimate. *Dailey Co.* v. *Clark Can Co., supra; cf. Oldershaw* v. *Kingsbaker Bros. Co.* (Cal. 1921) 200 Pac. 729.

DIVORCE—SUBSEQUENT REMARRIAGE—ESTOPPEL OF COMPLAINANT IN PREVIOUS DIVORCE ACTION.—A wife wrongfully obtained a decree of divorce in Pennsylvania which was void in New York. The husband now sues for divorce in New York on the ground that the wife's subsequent marriage was an adulterous cohabitation. Her defense is that his subsequent marriage, though in good faith, was also adulterous. *Held,* decree granted. *Kelsey* v. *Kelsey* (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1921) 190 N. Y. Supp. 52.

The case is decided on the ground that public policy requires the granting of the decree to enable the husband to remarry his second wife and legitimatize her child. In actions attacking the validity of a previous decree of divorce the court will always seek to protect one who innocently married a party to the action. See *Dunn* v. *Dunn* (N. Y. 1834) 4 Paige 425, 431; *Stephans* v. *Stephans* (1875) 51 Ind. 542. It is likewise the policy of the law always to favor the legitimacy of children. *Cf. In re Stanton* (1910) 123 N. Y. Supp. 458; *Stein's Adm.* v. *Stein* (1908) 32 Ky. L. Rep. 664, 106 S. W. 860. Though based on these grounds of policy the decision might be justified by an application of established legal rules. One who remarries after a foreign decree of divorce is estopped from attacking that decree only in cases where nothing is involved but property rights. See *Marvin* v. *Foster* (1895) 61 Minn. 154, 160, 63 N. W. 484; see (1921) 21 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 821. So in the instant case the husband was not estopped but the wife was, because a plaintiff who has secured a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction is not permitted to attack that decree in a subsequent action, even though rights other than property rights are involved. *Bledsoe* v. *Seaman* (1908) 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576. The application of these rules to the instant case gives a fair result. The one who brought the situation about is left to suffer the consequences, and the innocent parties are protected.

EVIDENCE—CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES.—In a criminal prosecution, the court charged that the defendant might be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. On appeal, *held,* the charge was proper. *Rosen et al.* v. *United States* (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1920) 271 Fed. 651.

Under the early common law the testimony of all witnesses was entitled to equal weight, since, once admitted, the oath made the testimony valid. See 3 Wigmore, *Evidence,* (3d ed. 1904) § 2056. Soon, however, since accomplices generally testify under promise or expectation of some benefit, the possibility of perjury was felt to be too great to allow conviction on their uncorroborated testimony. See *ibid.* § 2057. So in England it became the settled practice to caution juries against giving too much weight to such evidence. See *Re Meunier* [1894] 2 Q. B. 415, 418. This practice was generally adopted in the United States. *State* v. *Harden* (N. C. 1837) 2 Dev. & B. 407. This, however, did not constitute the custom a rule of law. Consequently an omission of the caution is no ground for a new trial. See *Commonwealth* v. *Leventhal* (Mass. 1920) 128 N. E. 864, 866. More than half the jurisdictions of the United States now render uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice invalid by statute. See 3 Wigmore, *op. cit.* § 2056, note 10. Most of these laws, however, restrict this to felonies. *E. g.,* Ala. Criminal Code (1907) § 7897. Under such a statute, refusal so to instruct is ground for reversal. *State* v. *Jarvis* (1890) 18 Ore. 360. In England today a conviction will be reversed if, in the absence of corroborating testimony,